Taking about keeping it in the family, Gordon’s reshuffle means that in ministerial positions we now have the brothers Milliband, the Balls family and, last but not least, the Eagle twins.

Next thing we know we’ll find out that Hazel Blears is the long-lost daughter of Denis Skinner - although I wouldn’t mind seeing the look on Akehurst’s face when that story broke.

Is this a government or the fucking Generation Game and when can we expect to see Brucie appointed Minister for Gameshows?

Oh, and having written so many sex-ed posts in the last week, no one better dare mention ‘Come Dancing’ - that’s just not a mental picture I can work with at the moment.

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Thought I’d give everyone a timely reminder that ex-Tory whip David MacLean’s shameful attempt to exempt parliament from the Freedom of Information Act returns to the House of Commons today, and requires another solid filibustering performance from opponents to talk the bill out.

Couple of quick points to pick up, here.

MacLean claims that this exemption is necessary to preserve the confidentiality of MPs correspondence in relation to constituency casework. This is bullshit.

There are 24 clauses in FOIA setting out exemptions on disclosures, of which those most relevant to MacLean’s claims are:

Section 34. Exemption for parliamentary privilege.

Section 40. Exemption for information that cannot be released due to Data Protection Act 1998.

Section 41. Exemption for information provided in confidence.

Section 36. Exemption for information that, if disclosed, would be prejudicial to the effective conduct of public affairs, a neat little catch-all clause that includes cover for information that:

would, or would be likely to, inhibit-

(i) the free and frank provision of advice, or

(ii) the free and frank exchange of views for the purposes of deliberation, or

(c) would otherwise prejudice, or would be likely otherwise to prejudice, the effective conduct of public affairs.

All of which neatly covers pretty much anything of a legitimately confidential nature that might crop up in a MP’s constituency casework.

This, it seems, is not good enough for Labour MP Martin Salter who claims:

“Members on both sides of the House have found their correspondence to a public authority already revealed to a third party,” he said.

“This is completely unacceptable.”

If that’s the case then it rather rather odd that no MP has yet raised the matter of such disclosures with the Office of the Information Commissioner, as this FOIA request of my own clearly demonstrates:

Question.

1. What representations, if any, has David MacLean MP made to the Information Commissioner in regards to this proposed legislation [the exemption bill], prior to its introduction to the House of Commons?

2. Has Mr MacLean, or any other Member of Parliament, consulted with or sought the advice of the Information Commissioner in the matter of the application of the Freedom of Information Act to MPs correspondence with Public Authorities and, if so, what guidance has been issued to them by the Information Commissioner, particularly in regard to applicability of existing exemptions in the Act to MP’s correspondence?

Please enclose copies of any/all relevant correspondence relating to this inquiry

Response:

I can advise you that the Information Commissioner does not hold any information relating to your request. The Information Commissioner received no approach from Mr MacLean or any other Member of Parliament in relation to this matter.

Funny that, MPs are (allegedly) having their casework correspondence disclosed under FOIA on both sides of the House as yet not one of the them has raised the matter with the Information Commissioner?

Methinks there are some terminological inexactitudes in play here.

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It is maxim of debates surrounding electoral systems that first past the post elections naturally produce a two-party system while proportional representation produces naturally leads to multi-party democracy.

This is true, but only within defined limits, and those limits explain why the single biggest barrier to the introduction of PR in Westminster elections is also the party that believes that it has most to gain from electoral reform - the Liberal Democrats.

Remember ‘The Project’?

The - possibly apocryphal - plan that was allegedly spearheaded by Peter Mandelson and which, so the story goes, would have led to the development of closer ties between Labour and the Liberal Democrats and maybe even at least a defined centre-left alliance, if not - gasp - the merger of the two parties.

Ever wonder what that might have all been about?

The whole episode is shrouded with rumour and conjecture, but what is known is that Blair, Mandelson and other close associates gave all the appearance of supporting moves toward electoral reform and proportional representation, without ever making it a manifesto commitment, prior to the 1997 election, only to cool very rapidly on the subject, and on collaborative working with the Liberal Democrats on gaining power.

So does this indicate that this apparent enthusiasm for, or openness towards, PR at the time was a mere electoral ruse?

Perhaps… and then perhaps not.

Proportional representation does tend to favour multi-party politics… but if one looks at those countries where PR is in use AND which have a more or less stable democracy (i.e. one disregards countries like Italy, which tend to be rather chaotic) what one finds is that their respective multi-parties systems tend to resolve themselves in line with one of two patterns:

1. A centre-based system dominated by a single large centrist party leading a variable multi-party coalition, or

2. A two-party block system in which power pivots around a single main party occupying the centre-left and centre-right with minor parties arrayed outwards from the two main parties to the political fringes.

A centre-based system is general considered undesirable for obvious reasons - but for seismic shift in the political culture of a country with a centre-based system, the dominant centrist party will remain a permanent fixture and political change is reduced to matters of fine degree depending on which side of political spectrum afford the most advantageous opportunities for coalition at any given time.

A two-party block system offers more scope for political change while remaining relatively stable. Power can shift across the centre from left to right and vice versa and outwards from the centre within each of the blocks according to the distribution of votes across the respective coalitions, while still offering the possibility of strong, decisive leadership/government. Except on rare occasions, such as happened at the last general election in Germany, one of the two blocks will achieve a sufficient degree of electoral ascendancy to become the ruling party at the head of a coalition that favours their side of the political divide, i.e. one gets a centre left government with minor coalition partners from socialist/green parties or one gets a centre-right government with minor coalition partners from nationalist/free market/libertarian parties.

This is pretty much how the German system operates in practice, this being the two-party block system with which most people will be familiar.

This is also what, for the time being at least, rules out an prospect of PR in Westminster elections, because, in the UK, the position of Liberal Democrats within the prevailing political spectrum precludes the development of PR-based system of government based on either of the centre-based or two-party block models.

Britain has the basic foundations necessary for a two-party block system - two large and electorally dominant parties occupying the centre-left and centre-right positions. but is also has a fly in the ointment, the Liberal Democrats, who straddle the political divide as a centrist party but lack the necessary level of electoral support to become the dominant centrist party necessary to form a centre-based system.

To compound matters further, the Liberal Democrats are only a centrist party in so far as their political philosophy rests on a delicate balancing act between political viewpoint that belong, more naturally, on either side of the political divide.

Broadly speaking, what one finds within the Liberal Democrat ‘canon’ are both economic liberals, whose natural inclinations take them towards the right, and social liberals, whose inclination are to the left.

This, together with a more or less established pattern of voting in UK general elections since 1974 - the winning party will typically get around 40% over the popular vote, the second place party 30% and the third party 20%, creates a scenario in which, were PR to be introduced and this pattern remain constant, the outcome would be a system in which the Liberal Democrats would become a permanent minority party in government because neither of the two main parties could take the necessary number of seats to form a government without their support.

This is problematic enough on its own, but then one has to factor in the slightly schizophrenic nature of modern liberalism, which may oscillate between right-wing economic liberalism and left-wing socialism as and when the occasion demand leaving the Liberal Democrats as a party that is seen by both Labour and Conservatives as being neither fish nor fowl and therefore unreliable, and potentially opportunistic, coalition partners.

Since the advent of universal suffrage (at the age of 21) in 1928, only once has either of the main parties secured more than 50% of the popular vote - the Conservatives in 1931, although this resulted in the formation of a ‘National Labour’ government under James Ramsay MacDonald. From 1935 to 1970, Britain had a de facto two party system due to the electoral collapse of the Liberal Party.

Over that period the two main parties took a combined share of the popular vote that never once fell below 90% although neither party was ever able to break the ‘magic’ 50% mark - Labour came closest in 1945 with 49.7% of the popular vote.

And since 1974, give or take Labour’s difficult period during the mid-1980 where there were two ‘third’ parties, the Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party, the 40:30:20 split has been the prevailing voting pattern in general elections.

Understand this and one can easily understand what Mandelson’s ‘Project’ was - if it did, indeed, exist.

If one presumes, as Mandelson would have at the time, that the Liberal Democrats were more inclined to social rather than economic liberalism, then a merging of the Liberal Democrats with ‘New’ Labour coupled with electoral reform and the introduction of PR offered the possibility of, at least, a two-party block system in which the Centre-Left would have a clear advantage over the Conservatives, if not even a centre-based system in which the merged Lib-Dem/New Labour ‘party’ occupied the dominant centrist position.

At the time the Conservative Party had little by way of natural coalition partners on the right. There were, and still are, the Unionist parties in Northern Ireland. UKIP was only in its formative stages. Goldsmith’s ‘Referendum Party’ were no more than spoilers and beyond that lay only the lunatic fringes of the BNP and the far right.

By contrast, a merged Centre-Left party formed from the Liberal Democrats and New Labour would conceivably has lost some support to the left through the formation of a breakaway Socialist party but could draw, in addition, on both the Scottish and Welsh Nationalists, both of whom are left-wing nationalist parties - remembering that, at the time, such a party would still have had the devolution carrot to dangle in front of the SNP and Plaid Cymru, and the Greens. Oh, and as with the BNP on the far right, the far left (SWP, Scargill’s Socialist Labour Party and the variant Communist Parties - there were several) were not significant enough in terms of support to be a factor.

All told, the political scene in 1997, would have looked ripe for the possibility of establishing a long-lasting, if not near permanent centrist political hegemony provided that a number of key assumptions held valid, the most important of which being that:

a) Liberal Democrat support would move en bloc into the new centrist ‘grouping’, i.e. the majority of Lib Dem supporters were more social than economic liberals, and

b) That this new centrist block would strip a sufficient number of centre-right conservatives out of the Conservative Party to preclude any efforts to move the party back into the centre ground.

That’s the theory - and whether its also what Mandelson was thinking at time is known only to him and those of his close colleagues with whom he may have shared his thoughts.

What this does illustrate, however, is the extent to which the very existence of Liberal Democrats as a distinct political party mitigates against any moves to introduce PR by either of the main parties.

From the standpoint of the Labour Party, the political conditions necessary to introduce PR and establish a centre/centre-left political hegemony existed only while the Conservative Party remained out to the right and operated on broadly Thatcherite terms. Only under those circumstances could a new centrist bloc hope to draw off enough Tory centrists to preclude the Conservatives making a credible move back to the centre - it wouldn’t prevent them trying to make such a move for purely strategic/pragmatic reasons but without a critical mass of in-house centrists, i.e. a definably ‘one nation’ social liberal win, such a move would lack credibility and, almost certainly, fail to persuade the Thatcherite wing that a move to the centre was the right course.

From a Tory standpoint, PR would look attractive only if they could be sure of  pulling off something akin to Mandelson’s alleged ‘Project’ but in the reverse direction - it would need to shift to the centre and absorb the majority of the Liberal Democrats support, while pushing Labour out to the left and, also, stripping away enough of the Blairite wing of the party to preclude Labour credibly moving back to the centre to block the formation of a centre-right led centre-based system. The irony here is that the Tories best chance of pulling off such a move has also come and gone - it would have been possible during the mid 1980s had the Tories had a centrist leader and moved to consolidate the centre ground (and absorb the Liberal/SDP Alliance of the time).

Such are the vagaries of political fate that both main parties have had the opportunity to establish a centrist hegemony slanted towards their preferred political direction only to fail to capitalise on the chance when it came. The Tories chance passed them by because of simple bad timing, the opportunity arose at a time when, in terms of leadership and ideology, it was least capable of capitalising on the political conditions around it. In Labour’s case things are perhaps a little more complex, not least as the lingering antipathies of the SDP’s split would have been a factor, but one suspects strongly that the key barriers to such a move rested in the same agreements that elevated Blair to the party leadership - left to his own devices he could have pulled it off but never had quite the level of support necessary within the party to overcome internal resistance to such a move. Labour never did come to love Mandelson, and without that ‘The Project’ was never a realistic proposition.

With both main parties crowding the centre-ground there is now no question of PR becoming a vehicle for the establishment of a centre-based multi-party system with a dominant, hegemonic, centrist party, which leaves the Liberal Democrats in the invidious position of being the both the greatest prospective beneficiary of PR and its greatest obstacle, as neither the Conservative or Labour Parties will accept a position in which power can only be attained by making the Liberal Democrats a permanent fixture in government, leaving them both as hostages to fortune.

This is the paradox of electoral reform in the UK. Denied the possibility of establishing a lasting electoral superiority by becoming the dominant centrist party in a centre-based system, the only outcome that would bring both the Conservative and Labour Parties behind a move to PR for Westminster elections would be if this would lead to the establishment of a German-style two-party block system with each occupying their respective centre-right and centre-left positions, much as the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats do in Germany.  And to arrive at such a position, a necessary precondition would be the complete demise of the Liberal Democrats, together with a more or less 50-50 split in Liberal Democrat support between economic liberals - who’d go to the Tories - and social liberals - who move to Labour.

Under present conditions, it would take a seismic and unprecedented shift in the UK’s political landscape for the Liberal Democrats to ever become a serious party of government and achieve their objective of proportional representation for the Westminster parliament.

How seismic? Try either an outright Lib Dem election victory and mass defections of centrists from both the Conservative and Labour Parties leading to a centre-based system or the complete collapse of one of these two parties, allowing the Lib Dems to shift into either the centre-right or centre-left position in two party block system. A ‘three-handed’ system is never going to happen nor will either of the main parties surrender to a Liberal Democratic hegemony by default, which means that even a hung parliament will not deliver PR because, much as is the case in Scotland with the SNP’s efforts to hold a referendum on Independence, neither of the main parties will willingly acquiesce to a commitment to introduce PR at Westminster simply to cement a ruling coalition as such a move, for all it may appear expedient in the short term, would run contrary to their interests in the long run.

Make no mistake here, no matter what any party might say in the run in to the next election, a hung parliament does not mean the introduction of PR, it means minority government and political instability.

There, like it or not, is the reality of electoral reform as it stands today. If you want PR and a multi-party democracy then, first, you must kill off the Liberal Democrats and consign the party to the dustbin of political history. Nothing less will do.

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Friday is easily the dullest day of the Parliamentary week. The House is usually half empty, with many MPs using the day to travel back to their constituencies and the legislative programme, such as it is, is generally confined to secondary legislation and private members’ bills, few of which tend to be of much interest to anyone but thier sponsors.

Today, however, is set to be a little different as a somewhat unusual parliamentary event (for this day and age) is set to take place.

Around the time that former Tory Whip, David MacLean, introduced his private members’ bill, which seeks to exempt MPs entirely from the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act, he commented rather boastfully that:

“I am showing some of the younger hands how you can get a bill through parliament after long experience as a whip in both getting and blocking bills through parliament.”

Well, I’m reliably informed that his boast will come back to haunt him today, as Lib Dem MP Norman Baker intends to give a display of his own experience in blocking bills by mounting a filibuster on the bill in order to prevent it becoming law, a fairly rare event in an era in which parliamentary time is tightly controlled and use of such tactics heavily curbed by means of guillotine motions.

Without checking the schedule, its not clear quite how long Baker will need to speak for to talk out the bill - the record for this century (3 hours 17 minutes) was set in 2005 by Andrew Dismore while ‘talking out’ another private members bill - the Criminal Law (Amendment) (Protection of Property) Bill - although Dismore’s speech was not a true filibuster in the sense that he accepted interventions during his speech rather than speaking continuously for the entire period.

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Oh dear, so the Maximum Tone’s blown the gaff on one of the worst kept secrets in British politics with his recent missive to 27,000 or so signatories to an anti-ID cards petition on the Downing Street website:

“I believe that the National Identity Register will help police bring those guilty of serious crimes to justice.

“They will be able, for example, to compare the fingerprints found at the scene of some 900,000 unsolved crimes against the information held on the register.”

It goes without saying that the 900,000 unsolved crimes statistic is a load of bollocks, as usual - what the police actually have is 900,000 unidentified ‘marks’ (i.e. fingerprints) from crime scenes, which includes multiple fingerprints from individual crime scenes, partial fingerprints that are useless for matching against the biometric data to be held in the National Identity Register and, of course, unidentified fingerprints that are of no relevance whatsoever the crime that took place at a particular scene.

If all this seems farcical, it’s nothing to the reaction of the opposition parties:

Lib Dem home affairs spokesman Nick Clegg told BBC Radio 4’s World at One: “We were left clearly with the impression that the police simply wouldn’t be able to go on fishing expeditions just with their own say so.”

And…

For the Conservatives, shadow home office minister Damian Green said: “It flatly goes against all the undertakings the government gave Parliament during the course of the bill.

“Obviously it has huge implications for people’s privacy if the authorities are going to be allowed to go on a fishing expedition through the files of innocent people.

“Everyone assumes that fingerprint technology is 100% accurate. And it just isn’t, experience tells us that it’s not infallible.

“With the vast number of crimes involved, it is guaranteed there are going to be miscarriages of justice if the government goes down this route.”

All of which appear to rest on a narrow interpretation of a single comment by Tony McNulty (you might guess that this twat would right in the middle of things):

Mr Blair’s email appears to contradict an assurance given by Tony McNulty, a Home Office Minister, when the legislation was going through the Commons in 2005. Mr McNulty said there were safeguards against state agencies “for want of a better phrase, going fishing in the database”.

Assurances, my arse.

Try reading what’s actually in the fucking bill (or Act as it is now) for a change.

The relevant part of the Act runs from s17 to s21, which covers the disclose of information from the NIR to public authorities (including the police and security services) without the consent of individuals - tell you what, let’s include a few selected highlights:

17 Public authorities etc.

(1) The Secretary of State may, without the individual’s consent, provide a person with information recorded in an individual’s entry in the Register if-

(a) the provision of the information is authorised by this section; and

(b) there is compliance with any requirements imposed by or under section 21 in relation to the provision of the information.

Following which the section goes on to specify who the information can be given to - which includes the security services, the police and HM Revenue and Customs. other government departments and any ‘designated documents authority - and what the circumstances in which they can be given the information; i.e. in the interests of national security, for the prevention and detection of crime and, in the the case of HM R&C for:

(c) for purposes connected with the prevention, detection or investigation of conduct in respect of which the Commissioners have power to impose penalties, or with the imposition of such penalties;

(d) for the purpose of facilitating the checking of information provided to the Commissioners in connection with anything under their care and management, or with any other matter in relation to which the Commissioners have duties under any enactment;

(e) for purposes connected with any of the functions of the Commissioners in relation to national insurance contributions or national insurance numbers;

In short, when it comes to collecting tax and locating people to screw the tax out of, HM R&C have more or less the free run of the NIR system, which is all pretty obvious when you come to think about it.

As for the other agencies mentioned, a designated documents authority, as those with a fair memory may recall, is one where the government has decided that to get whatever official document it is they provide you must also take out or have an ID card. So, in a nutshell, this paves the way for automatic updating of things like the Passport, Driving Licence and Visa systems directly from NIR, plus anything else not expressly mentioned in the Act that the government might add at a later stage by statutory instrument - expect to see things like the Criminal Records Bureau, Registrar of Birth, Deaths and Marriages added by the time it goes live, if its not already been added plus the obvious, if rather more controversial future targets, NHS Medical Cards, UB40s (or whatever the equivalent is these days if its changed) and pretty much anything to do with the receipt of welfare benefits, and the Electoral Register.

That just leaves other government department, who can access your information just so long as its:

for purposes connected with the carrying out of any prescribed functions of that department or of a Minister in charge of it.

Which covers just about anything and everything.

Let’s face it, that last bit is a real piece of work isn’t it? What it amounts to is that if the government finds a new use for your personal data it doesn’t necessarily actually have to pass anything so messy as a piece of new primary of secondary legislation - as long as this new function does not require legislation to enable it, it can just tack it on to the duties of the relevant department and away that department goes.

And even such a new function does require legislation, who’s going to think of asking whether it has an implications for the use of personal data from the NIR? After all, this is all in the Act, as passed by Parliament, and if their reaction to Blair’s email is anything to by then none of the bastards noticed it, having been lulled into a false sense of security by Tony McNulty of all people!

Moving ahead slightly, s18 of the Act covers the specifics of using information from the NIR for the prevention and detection of crime:

18 Prevention and detection of crime

(1) The Secretary of State may, without the individual’s consent, provide a person with information recorded in an individual’s entry in the Register if-

(a) the provision of the information is authorised by this section; and

(b) there is compliance with any requirements imposed by or under section 21 in relation to the provision of the information.

The actual payload in this section is ferreted away in paragraph under a bunch of guff about anti-terrorism legislation:

4) The provision of information falling within paragraph 9 of Schedule 1 is authorised by this section if it is provided-

(a) to a person to whom information may be provided by virtue of any of subsections (3) to (5) of section 17 or is made as mentioned in subsection (2) of this section; and

(b) for purposes connected with the prevention or detection of serious crime.

Let’s clarify a few things first.

Schedule 1 actually sets out what information can be held on the NIR and the persons mentioned in subsections (3) to (5) of s17 are the police, HM R&C and other government departments.

And paragraph 9 of the schedule? Well what that covers is the NIRs ‘Audit Trail’, i.e. the record of every occasion that the NIR is accessed in order to verify an individual’s identity, which amounts to:

(a) particulars of every occasion on which information contained in the individual’s entry has been provided to a person;

(b) particulars of every person to whom such information has been provided on such an occasion;

(c) other particulars, in relation to each such occasion, of the provision of the information.

Although not made explicit, one can safely bet that the particular of ‘every person’ to whom information has been supplied will include the location of that person and the time of verification, and therefore your own location at that time.

This is the infamous ‘tracking system’ - make a credit purchase in Currys which requires to you to provide your ID and the NIR logs your location, etc.

S19 and 20, I’ll skip over briefly.

S19 confers the power to automatically update records if anything is found to be in error or incomplete and facilitates data sharing, so if the info on your tax records is found to be out of date when compared to what’s held by the DVLA, then everything can be brought up to date without you knowing about it, while S20 is a catch all allowing the government to tack on new authorised users subject to secondary legislation.

And that brings us to S21, which completes the deal:

21 Rules for providing information without individual’s consent

(1) Under sections 17 to 20 the Secretary of State may provide a person with information within paragraph 2 of Schedule 1 only if he is satisfied that it would not have been reasonably practicable for the person to whom the information is provided to have obtained the information by other means.

You got that? Paragraph 2 of the schedule covers the following:

(a) a photograph of his head and shoulders (showing the features of the face);

(b) his signature;

(c) his fingerprints;

(d) other biometric information about him.

So any of the agencies specified in s17 can be provided with any of the biometric information in the NIR just as long as its for any of the purposes specified in that section - which includes prevention and detection of crime - but only if it would not be ‘reasonably practicable’ to get it by other means.

So when it comes to fingerprints, it would only be ‘reasonably practical’ for the police to get that information if its already in the police’s own system - and if it isn’t they can get it out of the NIR anyway.

This is all already in the Act as it was passed by Parliament, and while the rest of s21 covers all the different circumstances in which the government may regulate how this information is passed on, by statutory instrument, the core principle - that certain agencies have near free reign to mine the NIR for information for certain specified purposes is already clearly established. All that up for debate is how such access granted place, not whether its granted in the first place and about the most that could be done to stymie this would be for the opposition to throw in an amendment requiring a warrant issued by a court to authorise a police ‘fishing expedition’…

…All assuming that further regulations are necessary to facilitate the specifics of police access to NIR, as it could well be argued by the government that this is already covered in other legislation - such as PACE.

This is all there in the legislation that was put to parliament and approved, and yet both the Lib Dems and the Tories are now acting surprised when it turns out that one of main function of the NIR is going to be for it to serve as a full population, master fingerprint database for the police - just exactly what the fuck are we (the taxpayer) paying these wankers for when they go an miss something as fucking obvious as this when its put right in front of them?

Just exactly what kind of fucking morons have we got in parliament that they fail to ask even basic questions when the whole thing is laid out before them and all on nothing more substantial than a one-line ‘assurance’ from a mendacious twat like McNulty?

Let’s not forget here that the only reason that this Act passed was because Cameron allowed himself to be ‘Sir Humprey’d’ in the House of Lords over the question of whether ID cards should be issued alongside passports right from the off and put out the whips to ensure that a compromise clause went through - and then they claim to have completely missed something like this?

Talk about a complete bunch of morons, or what!

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Jack’s arguments on House of Lords reform… Mmm… where to start.

Tell you what, lets get religion out of the way first and look at what Jack’s putting forward as arguments in favour of religious representation in the second chamber.

6.22 It is important that faith communities are represented in the House of Lords.

Ah, ‘faith communities’ eh? So right from the outset, we’re taking the line that religion and religious belief can be happily used to divide people up in nice, easily boxed, lumps of homogeneous interests; interests that require some form of ‘official’ representation that’s entirely separate and distinct from any representation that religious belief may get simply because individual members of the House espouse a particular personal faith.

So, what we’re about, then, is preserving the status quo.

The Church of England, as the established Church, enjoys a special status in social and political life in England and more widely around the United Kingdom. This has long been recognised even by people who are not themselves Anglicans.

Well yes, Jack. Quite.

Jack? Just exactly how are you using the word ‘recognised’ here?

Even as an atheist and a secularist I have to recognise that the Anglican Church enjoys as ’special status’ in the social and political life of the United Kingdom. It would be absurd not to recognise that because that it exactly how things are.

The Church of England occupies a massively privileged position is society, one that currently affords it, amongst other things, a guaranteed twenty-six seats in the House of Lords, massive amounts of state funding for Church of England Schools, mandatory religious education and ‘broadly Christian’ acts of worship even in non-faith state schools and even a guaranteed amount of religious broadcast on Britain’s terrestrial television stations.

It would be stupid not to recognise the existence of all that - but whether I agree with any or all of that and whether I recognise that as having any substantive value is another matter entirely.

I can’t but feel that recognise is being used here in a deeply disingenuous manner is order to imply widespread acceptance of the privileges and status of the Church of England without actually allowing the matter of whether that status, and especially the privileges that go with it, are accepted to the test.

Lords Spiritual have sat in the Lords since its inception.

And so have a number of hereditary peers, what of it?

They are the only category of member whose term is limited to the holding of their office.

And that’s because their position in the legislature is directly attached to their religious office. Again we have deliberately disingenuous point being advanced as some sort of mitigation for the privileged status afforded to Anglican Bishops.

The correct manner in to view this is not in terms of the individual but the office - Dr Rowan Williams will, one day, cease to be a member of the House of Lords when he vacates his office as Archbishop of Canterbury… but the Archbishop of Canterbury will always be a member of the House of Lords, no matter who the incumbent is at any given time.

There have in the past been arguments about the disestablishment of the Church of England. There is little steam behind such arguments today, and, in any event, any profound change in the status of the Church must be in the first instance for the Church itself. It is therefore right for there to continue to be special representation of the Church of England in the reformed Lords.

No. No. No. No. No…

Is there really ‘little steam’ behind arguments for disestablishment today, Jack? Have you even bothered to ask?

Of course not.

There has been no public debate on the subject of disestablishment whatsoever, so one cannot assert that there is ‘little steam’ behind such arguments as the question hasn’t been asked. Jack seems to be having a bit of Lord Nelson moment - ‘I see no debate’ - and yet, after his interjection, last year, on the subject of the niqab, he cannot be unaware that there is a considerable, wide-ranging and ongoing public debate about the status and privileges afforded to religion and religious belief by the state.

The main problem here is that ‘disestablishment’ is being used as a canard. In broad historical terms arguments for disestablishment have always arisen in concert with arguments from republicanism and have, therefore, had a very narrow focus on the dual role of the reigning monarch as both Head of State and Head of the Church of England. The counter-argument has, therefore, always been limited to the suggestion that the two roles undertaken by the monarch are somehow indivisible and that disestablishment of the Church of England would, in some generally unspecified form, unduly and negatively impact on the position and status of the monarch as Head of State.

This is simply not true.

Disestablishment of the Church of England would have no constitutional impact on the position of the monarch as Head of State, it would merely enforce a separation of the two roles. Technically, a disestablished Church of England would not have to seek the assent of Parliament in order to remove the reigning monarch as Head of the Church, but such a decision would be entirely in the hands of the Church itself - it would have a free choice in the matter - but disestablishment, itself, would not automatically alter the position and status of the reigning monarch within the Church.

The real debate around disestablishment rests not on the dual role of the monarch but on the privileges and status that the Church of England enjoys by virtue of being the official state church, i.e. its guaranteed seats in the legislature, access to state funding for Church schools, etc… all things that are very much open to debate and that are, increasing, being openly questioned in the course of the public discourse surrounding the role of religious belief in society in general.

These could, and should be debated openly, especially at a time when reform of the House of Lords, and therefore the future status of Anglican Bishops in the legislature is under discussion, and yet it seems clearly that we are, as citizens, to be denied the right to participate in any such debate.

If that were not bad enough, Jack goes on to assert that ‘any profound change in the status of the Church must be in the first instance for the Church itself’. That is complete and utter nonsense, not to mention deeply undemocratic. If that the best argument that Jack Straw can put forward then he should, frankly, be ashamed of himself.

What Jack is stating here is nothing more than the view that the position and status of the Church of England is not a matter to be decided by Britain’s citizens, unless the Church of England, itself, wishes to make such a decision, which amounts to never, or at least not until turkeys start voting for Christmas.

Think about that for a moment. Out of a total electorate well in excess of 40 million adults, a grand total of 574 people - the members of the Church of England’s General Synod* - are the only people who Jack thinks should have any say whatsoever in the matter of whether the Church of England should be afforded guaranteed seats in legislature of the United Kingdom, unless they decide that they want to give everyone else a say in the matter. But then, should that be any surprise to us. After all out of that same total electorate, less than 1500 people - the combined memberships of the Houses of Common and Lords - are to be given any say at all in the matter of reform of the House of Lords.

It should also be noted that the General Synod is also the only body in the UK to have law-making powers delegated to it by Parliament. The General Synod can pass what are called Measures on any matter to do with the Church of England, which then become part of English law - these Measures do have to be agreed by Parliament, but only in so far as Parliament can vote to accept or reject them before the receive Royal Assent, but these MEasures cannot be amended by Parliament.

6.23 Whilst recognising the quality of work Lords Spiritual bring to the House, there remains a strong case for a more flexible approach which would allow the Church to determine, from among the Bishops, those who they consider would be able to make the best contribution, rather than appointment on seniority. Assuming the overall size of the House reduces, it would be difficult to justify retaining the current number of 26 Lords Spiritual.

Well, yes. Obviously.

Although, again the wording here is very interesting inasmuch as Jack refers to the quality of their contributions, which is hardly surprising as of the twenty-six Bishops in the current House of Lords, a mere three have voted in more more that 4% of the votes taken in the House over the last year and the ‘top performer’ - the Bishop of Chester - managed to get along to the House for only 12% of all votes taken.

Jack does offer up some quantitative figures later on in the White Paper:

For example, of the Lords Spiritual between April 2005 and March 2006, 11 attended more than 25 times (out of a possible total of 134). 12 attended fewer than 20 times. 42% of the total number of attendances was accounted for by just 5 of the Bishops and the top 16 Bishops accounted for 89% of total attendances.

But that’s not data, that’s a GCSE maths problem set by a drunken surrealist. The statistics given, in a passage that deals with the issue of reducing the total number of Bishops in the House, are presented in such a deliberately confusing manner as to make it impossible to come to clear view on either existing levels of attendance and how this might shape further thinking on the exact number of Bishops to be included in the reformed House.

On its own, that would sufficient to raise suspicions that something a little ‘iffy’ is going on here, even without taking into account the comments immediately preceding this ‘data’.

The Government has always recognised that the nature of diocesan Bishops’ work means that it is very difficult for many of them to attend the House of Lords with regularity and therefore that their overall representation needs to be higher than would otherwise be appropriate. However, a smaller number than 26 would still deliver this. Much of the work in the House is already done by a smaller core team of Bishops.

In short, whatever number is finally arrived at, it will almost certainly be more than can be reasonably justified by any rational measurement.

The importance of this is that the proposed shape of the reformed House with eventually come down to a maximum of 540 members of whom 20% (108) will be non-political appointees, i.e. cross-benchers. And one would presume that as the remaining 80% of members will be political (either by way of election or appointment in Jack’s model), it would seem that whatever the exact number of seats allocated to Bishops turns out to be, those seats will come from the non-political 20% and, crucially, will account for something more than a number that could reasonably be considered to be the Church’s ‘fair share’.

To put that in context, if we define the actual ‘constituency’ represented by Anglican Bishops in terms of regular church attendance (i.e. once a month or greater) then on the Church’s own figures, their constituency amounts to a little over 800,000 people across the whole of England - remember, neither the Church in Wales or the Presbytarian Church in Scotland is afforded seats in the House by right.

What we can conclude from this is that:

a) Whatever the allocation afforded to the Church of England eventually turns out to be, the Church will be disproportionate over represented in the reformed House.

b) This will operate to the detriment of the independent cross-bench contingent in the reformed chamber, which will have a disproportionate number of seats taken up by members whose attendance at the House can be, at best, described as ‘poor’.

And.

c) That Jack, and others, are fully aware of this and have drafted the White Paper in such a way as to obscure this from the public, deliberately, so as to ensure that this issue received little or no effective scrutiny.

And we’re not finished yet, by any means:

6.24 It is equally important that a reformed House of Lords reflects the wider religious make-up of the United Kingdom, though the formal nominated representation of particular faith groups may not be possible. As the Wakeham Commission pointed out “It is clearly not possible to find a way in which all other faith communities could be formally represented on any kind of ex-officio basis. None of them has a suitable representative body.

Well that’s not strictly true, for starters - it all depends on what you mean by ‘other faiths’. If, by ‘other faith’ you specifically mean ‘not Christianity’ then, yes, it may be difficult to identify specifically religious organisations who could provide ‘official representatives’ akin to those supplied by the Anglican Church.

If, however, you mean ‘not the Anglican Church’ then that’s not true. The Roman Catholic Church, which on regular attendance is actually slightly larger than the Anglican Church, has a perfectly well-established official church hierarchy that could easily supply ‘representatives’ of this kind, as do a number of other sizeable Christian denominations. It also rather presupposes that those faiths that lack this kind of official hierarchy would be incapable of arriving at some sort officially sanctioned representative by other means.

What is there, for example, to prevent an organisation like the Muslim Council of Britain organising its own internal election, from amongst the Mosques affiliated to it, in order to arrive at a representative sanction, if not by all Muslims, then by a significant majority. One can apply that argument to most, if not all, of the main non-Christian faiths, and yet that’s a possibility that neither Jack, nor Lord Wakeham, seems to have recognised.

Overall, the impression given is one of offering ‘faith communities’ representation, but only on the preferred terms of the government. i.e. the government wishes to choose who represents those communities on their behalf and not allow them a free choice of who, nominally, speaks for.

None of that, however, addresses the more fundamental question of whether ‘faith communities’ really need or merit official representation of this kind.

Why should the legislature include individuals who are specifically there to ‘represent’ so-called ‘faith communities’?

Why does religious belief require such representation?

Why is not enough that the House include individuals who, by dint of the personal beliefs, could be thought to be representative of the views of followers of different religious beliefs, as opposed to directly representing the beliefs themselves or, at the very least, the temporal hierarchies that have grown up around those beliefs?

And even if there are occasions on which one needs to get the ‘official line’ from a ‘faith community’, why does that necessitate official representation - there are many other ways of consulting and engaging with ‘faith communities’ and ensure that their expressed views are taken into account, ways that are not wholly reliant on having a designated individual to speak of their behalf.

For all that, Jack leaves his worst argument to last.

The Government will look carefully at how the views of those of faith and those of none can be represented in a reformed House of Lords. This will of course only be realistically possible if there is a significant appointed element in a reformed House.

Again, the argument is ambiguous and, I suspect, deliberately disingenuous inasmuch as he fails to qualify his reference to the necessity of a ’significant appointed element’ in the reformed House.

Taken at face value, the statement is true - if one genuinely wishes to ensure that there is a broad spread of ‘religious’ opinion in the House then one must look to appointment to deliver that; such a thing cannot be guaranteed by the vagaries of the electoral system and the ‘good offices’ of political parties.

But which ’significant appointed element’ is Jack referring to here, exactly?

Only the 20% designated for ‘independent’ members or does he intend this reference to interpreted more broadly as a justification for the additional 30% of members that the White Paper proposes should continue to be appointed to the House by way of direct political patronage?

Jack statement, here, leaves that question wide-open, and again I suspect deliberately so in order to try an conflate the strong arguments in favour an appointed ‘independent’ contingent in the reformed House with those, much weaker, arguments for the retention of political patronage.

There is one final point to be made here.

But for passages dealing with retired ‘Law Lords’* - or Justices of the Supreme Court as they will shortly be known - and ‘former public servants’**, ‘faith communities’ (and Anglican Bishops) are the only non political ‘interest group’ specifically referenced in the White Paper.

* To clarify this, the White Paper proposes that all Justices of the Supreme Court (i.e. Law Lords) should be offered a seat in the reformed House on their retirement from the judiciary, which on the face of it seems fairly reasonable. However, Straw also note that, presently, there are 19 such individuals (former Law Lords) in the House, all of whom sit as cross-benchers, which means another substantial ‘chunk’ of the maximum 108 ‘independent’ members will be taken up before we even get to the question of the House’s need for other forms of expertise.

* ‘Former public servants’ are discussed under argument for retaining Prime Ministerial appointments, and so fall within the proposals for 30% of the House to be made up of political appointees.
Which fair demands that we ask the question “why should so-called ‘faith communities’ be singled out in this manner as opposed to other nominal ‘interest communities’?

Why should we privilege religious belief over and above other common interests and the ‘communities’ that form around them?

I haven’t checked but I suspect that if we apply the same criteria on ‘regular attendance’ used by the Church of England then we’ll find that more people attend professional football matches in Britain on regular basis than attend Anglican Churches on the same basis, in which case why should we not guarantee the Football Association seats in the reformed House?

And what of the many other ‘communities’ one might reasonable define by way of their members holding a ‘common interest’, ‘communities’ that have an official ‘representative body. Could we not argue, for example, that business people form a ‘community’ and thereby grant seats by automatic right to the Confederation of British Industry.

What of medical professionals? Is the British Medical Association or the Royal College of Nurses (steady, Dr Crippen) or any one of a number of equally august fellowships that represent the profession, not equally deserving of our ‘recognition’ and have they not as much to contribute to civil society and to the legislature?

How about scientists? There is the Royal Society of London, one the most respected, if not the most respected scientific institution in the world, an organisation whose past presidents include Sir Christopher Wren, Samuel Pepys, Sir Issac Newton, Sir Humphrey Davy, T H Huxley, William Thomson (Lord Kelvin) and Ernest Rutherford. Can one really argue that we should privilege religion over an body that has provided the nation with such a line-up of intellectual giants?

Where is the argument that justifies the status and privileges afforded to religion in the legislature and yet, equally, justifies the denial of those same privileges to these and so many other ‘interest communities’?

Nowhere to be seen.

If I must sum up Straw’s arguments in this section in but a single word, that word can only be ’slippery’ - the White Paper does nothing to advance any substantive or rational arguments in favour of either retaining Bishops in the reformed House or extending a similarly privileged position to other ‘faith communities’, rather it does all that it can to close off public debate on this issue even to the extent of invoking arguments that are clear, fundamentally and unacceptably undemocratic.

Sorry, Jack, but this a poor effort. A very poor effort, indeed.

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Over the weekend I thought I’d take a little time to leaf through the upcoming Private Members’ Bills to see what the backbenches are up to, and turned up a few interesting snippets of possible legislation which need to watched closely.

First, and most important of all, we have this two clause bill, introduced by Conservative MP David MacLean, which attempts to give MPs and Peers a blanket exemption from the Freedom of Information Act…

Be it enacted by the Queen’s most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present

Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:—

1 Exemption of House of Commons and House of Lords

(1) The Freedom of Information Act 2000 (c. 36) is amended as follows.

(2) In Schedule 1, Part 1 (Public Authorities), delete paragraphs 2 and 3.

(3) After section 37 insert—

“37A Correspondence between Members of Parliament and public authorities

(1) Information is exempt information if it consists of correspondence between a Member of Parliament and a public authority, as listed in Schedule 1 of this Act.

(2) The duty to confirm or deny does not arise in relation to information which is exempt information by virtue of subsection (1).”

2 Short title, commencement and extent

(1) This Act may be cited as the Freedom of Information (Amendment) Act 2007.

(2) This Act comes into force at the end of a period of two months beginning with the day on which it is passed.

(3) This Act extends to Northern Ireland.

MacLean’s stated ‘concern’ is that FOIA could be used to obtain MPs correspondence relating to casework undertaken on behalf of constituents as noted here by the Guardian, the only newspaper thus far to have noticed the Bill.

David Maclean, the former Tory chief whip, introduced the measure in a private member’s bill. Mr Maclean said yesterday the main reason for his bill was to prevent MPs’ letters on behalf of constituents being released to the press and public.

Well yes, one can see where such correspondence might merit a degree of privilege, particularly in casework matters where the privacy of an MP’s constituents is an issue, but then…

He acknowledged the effect of the bill would be to exempt parliament from the act at a time when the parliamentary authorities have lost a case at an information tribunal after trying to block more detailed disclosure of MPs’ expenses.

Ahhhh… Now that’s a rather different matter altogether, which is why such a blanket exemption is such a bad idea, especially when we find that MacLean is making full use of his understanding of the ‘quirks’ of Parliamentary procedure in order to try get this bill through Parliament as quickly as possible and while drawing as little attention to it and its implications as possible:

When it was put to him that he had chosen the very end of a busy parliamentary day to get a second reading, he said: “I am showing some of the younger hands how you can get a bill through parliament after long experience as a whip in both getting and blocking bills through parliament.”

He added: “This bill will now go to a committee where all the issues can be debated.” But because the measure is in a private member’s bill, Mr Maclean is able to choose who sits on the committee.

So far this bill has already passed through its first and second reading without debate, and without even Mr MacLean speaking on its introduction, and will now be debated in a obscure committee by MPs chosen by Mr MacLean - how every open and transparent of him. And yet, there’s even more to come…

Mr Maclean, who is also a member of the House of Commons commission, the body responsible for the running of parliament, said his main reason for introducing the legislation was the complicated guidance about to be issued to more than 100,000 public authorities on whether they should release MPs’ letters. He said the guidance would make it clear that these letters should be kept confidential in all circumstances, as opposed to the present situation where some were released and others withheld.

So, even before the Information Commissioner has properly issued guidance on access to MPs correspondence, David MacLean wants to the settle the issue once and for all by removing all right of access to such correspondence to the extent that it will not even be possible to confirm whether or not such correspondence even exists.

Oh no, the right to a reasonable degree of privilege in communications with constituents is one thing, a blanket exemption of all information is quite another, and that why this morning, I’ve submitted this inquiry to the Information Commissioner:

Having noted that a private members’ bill (the Freedom of Information (Amendment) Bill) has been introduced by David MacLean MP, (Con: Penrith and The Border), and that this bill seeks to provide Members of Parliament with a blanket exemption from the Freedom of Information Act 2000; I would ask you to provide the following information, pursuant to S1 of the aforementioned Freedom of Information Act 2000.

1. What representations, if any, has David MacLean MP made to the Information Commissioner in regards to this proposed legislation, prior to its introduction to the House of Commons?

2. Has Mr MacLean, or another other Member of Parliament, consulted with or sought the advice of the Information Commissioner in the matter of the application of the Freedom of Information Act to MPs correspondence with Public Authorities and, if so, what guidance has been issued to them by the Information Commissioner, particularly in regard to applicability of existing exemptions in the Act to MP’s correspondence?

Please enclose copies of any/all relevant correspondence relating to this inquiry.

A reasonable set of questions, I’m sure you’ll agree, and one’s designed to find out whether there is any real basis to Mr MacLean’s ‘concerns’ and, by inference, whether there is any justification for this bill - The Index of Censorship think its all way over the top, and frankly I’m inclined to agree with them, so this is one where we (bloggers, I mean) need to be making a bit of a fuss.

Next on the agenda is an as yet unpublished bill from a former Chair of the Joint House Committee on Human Rights, Andrew Dismore, that aims to ‘clarify’ the meaning of ‘Public Authority‘ in the Human Rights Act 1998.

Dismore’s ‘beef’ seems fair enough; HRA 1998 defines the nature of a Public Authority in very broad terms (anything that undertakes functions of a public nature) in such as way that it was intended to encompass private sector companies and charities that deliver public services under contract to central and local government.

The precise definition of what is or isn’t an applicable public function was left to the courts and after a number of cases, include a couple involving care homes, it seems that the Joint Committee concluded that the ‘test’ being applied by the courts of whether something was a public authority was somewhat at odds with Parliament’s original intentions for the Act.

On the face of it, Dismore’s operating from good intentions, but until the Bill is published and we see how those intentions are manifested in print, its difficult to assess whether this bill will come in as a positive or a negative. Dismore notes, easrly in his speech, that HRA 1998, unlike the Freedom of Information Act, does not include a specific list of public authorities, which means that even with the uncertainties of relying on the courts for such definitions, the scope of HRA 1998 is considerably wider than than of FOIA 2000. If Dismore’s intent is to introduce an FOIA-style list then that could be a double-edged sword - such a list might just as easily be used to create back door exemptions to HRA 1998 by leaving things off the list as it can be used to close the loopholes about which Dismore expresses concern.

Unlike MacLean’s Bill, Dismore introduced his bill by speaking on it, and found himself facing opposition from the Tories, specifically, John Redwood, who’s opinion is that Dismore’s suggested amendments are unnecessary, because they could be dealt with in a much more straightforward fashion…

I want to make a simple point. The hon. Member for Hendon is attacking the actions of several elected councils—quite a few of them are probably Labour councils. He claims that they do not stand up for the most vulnerable in their community. Surely we, in the senior representative democratic forum in the country, should believe in the democratic system and in putting right such problems in provision by democratic challenge in the council chamber and through the intervention of councillors over their officers and over the supervision of contracts. If too many councillors have consented to too many bad contracts and vulnerable people are being damaged, that is a disgrace and it should be sorted out in the normal democratic way. If the councillors responsible cannot sort it out, I hope that their electors will take the necessary action at the ensuing council elections to change the management.

And, yes, Redwood does have a point here. In an ideal world, local democracy would be the optimum solution, but then that presupposes that local democracy works effectively, which it often doesn’t… all courtesy of three decades of near constant interference in local democracy by central government, interference that has seriously limited the scope of elected councillors to take the kind of action that Redwood suggests.

The real problem here, however, that this isn’t an either/or scenario. We need Redwood’s democratic accountability, of course, but such accountability does not afford the individual a means of personal redress if their human rights are violated, so we also need Dismore’s proposed clarification, provided its worded correctly and doesn’t create further loopholes.

This bill, when published, should go down as being one to watch.

Also on the watch list, but for very different reasons, should go the Intergovernmental Contracts (Provision of Information) Bill, which has been introduced by a Lib Dem, Dr John Pugh.

This is a no hoper of a Bill for pretty obvious reasons, as should be apparent from Pugh’s introductory speech:

The Bill is designed to deal with an absurdity and a scandal, and its genesis is easy to explain. A short while ago, as a member of the Public Accounts Committee, I was prompted to ask why the National Audit Office report on the al-Yamamah arms deal had not been published—a simple enough inquiry, not especially original and not without wider interest. The Committee convened in special session to answer the question. It met in camera, and I am not, frankly, allowed to tell the House what was said or who was there, although I will say that some eminent people were there—people who do not usually attend that Committee.

I can also say what the outcome, the conclusion, was: we discovered that no one on the Committee—none of the customarily fierce interrogators on the committee, nor the Chairman, nor a single living Member—has a right to see the document, even though it is about a Government contract, even though we can see every other NAO report ever written and even though it was written by a man who is technically a servant of the House.

The only Member who was ever gifted the privilege of reading was the former Member for Ashton-under-Lyne, Lord Sheldon [Labour, former Financial Secretary to the Treasury in the Wilson/Callaghan governments 1974-79]. Once the reading had been delegated to him, it seemed that no living soul could clap eyes on it again. My Bill seeks to rectify that absurdity. It would not ensure the publication of the NAO report. It would not undo the past. It seeks simply to provide a mechanism whereby Parliament’s right at least to scrutinise the doings of Government can be preserved.

What will make this one worth watching is precisely how and by whom and in what circumstances the Bill is killed off, and what this might then tell us about how government is operating.

Finally we have the as yet unpublished House of Commons (Participation) Bill by Robert Walter, which is supported by Derek Conway, John Redwood, Bill Etherington, Angela Browning, Mr. Christopher Fraser, Nigel Evans, David Taylor, Christopher Chope, Derek Wyatt, James Clappison and Peter Luff and will:

provide for the Speaker of the House of Commons to have power to determine the eligibility of members of the House of Commons to participate in certain legislative and other proceedings of the House:

Yes, this is the Tory’s EVOEM (English Votes on English Matters) Bill, which is due for its second reading on Friday 9 March, 2007 [getting the date right this time], which I would expect means that it’ll quietly sneak through to the committee stage without too much attention, much after the fashion of MacLean’s FOIA Bill, unless the Tories are planning a big media splash to go with it in the hope of procuring a bit of electoral advantage.

I’m not sure if this is the ‘done thing’ on Private Member’s legislation, but with the Tory’s planning to heavily push EVOEM - which is a constitutional shambles - as a way of obtaining an electoral advantage and attacking Gordon Brown, it might be worth finding a way to kill this off straight away, as no doubt, the ‘battleplan’ on the Tory side will be for this bill to re-emerge for its thrid reading just in time for the this year’s elections.
Okay, so that four bill to watch and bring to wider public attention, of which David MacLean’s FOIA opt-out bill for MPs in by far the most important to be tracking and flagging up.

So let’s all get to it…

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Reading through the transcript of Tuesday’s House of Common debate on an opposition (Plaid Cymru/SNP) motion calling for a select committee of Privy Councillors to…

…review the way in which the responsibilities of Government were discharged in relation to Iraq and all matters relevant thereto, in the period leading up to military action in that country in March 2003 and in its aftermath

…it’s neither difficult to appreciate how we’ve got to where we are today nor how badly there is the need for serious and comprehensive constitutional reform of our present Parliamentary system of government.

Two issues were at stake in Tuesday’s debate and in respects of the interests of the British people, the events leading in to the Iraq War, and its aftermath, was the less important of the two. The more important issue, on this occasion, was rather that of the capacity of Parliament to hold the Executive to account for its actions and on any reasonable reading of the debate it is clear that our elected representatives, taken as a whole, distinguished themselves on neither issue.

One could discern, quite easily, the general direction that the debate would be taking almost from the outset, and certainly from the point of the first intervention by a Labour MP, in this case one local to myself (Adrian Bailey, MP for West Bromwich West and PPS to the Cabinet Office Minister and former Chief Whip, Hilary Armstrong) who, a mere minute or so into the debate was moved to ask Adam Price (opening the debate for Plaid Cymru):

I quite understand that the hon. Gentleman feels very deeply about this issue. But do his electorate in Wales and the electorate in Scotland consider it to be the most pressing issue affecting them?

Why should we, the electorate, care about events taking place many thousands of miles away?

What concern is it of ours that on same day that Adrian Bailey questioned whether the British people can muster sufficient concern for Iraq to be supportive of Parliament’s efforts to debate the subject, a car bomb exploded in Sadr City killing 15 members of a wedding party and elsewhere in vicinity of Baghdad, 30 bus passengers were kidnapped by an armed gang?

Perhaps, in Adrian’s opinion, we would find some of the other matters raised in Parliament in the same week as this debate to be more in keeping with our view of what constitutes a pressing concern? Matters such as Edward Vaizey’s written question to the Leader of the House, enquiring as to the number of low-energy light bulbs purchased by the Privy Council offices in 2005 – written questions cost the taxpayer an average of £134 per question by the way. Or a written question from Lord Lester of Herne Hill inquiring as to the cost to the taxpayer of his questions inquiring as to the level of support afforded to government special advisors by various departments and how this might differ if the information he had requested in the past had been held centrally – the answer being that this information is not held centrally. Or what about another written question (from Mark Lancaster MP and fielded by Paymaster General, Dawn Primarolo) asking if the Chancellor of the Exchequer will ensure that envelopes supplied for the R40 form are wide enough to accommodate A4 paper – the R40 is used to claim tax refunds from the Inland Revenue.

Now who could ever accuse MPs of raising matters not of interest to their constituents?

If one thing is clear from the government response to the motion tabled by Adam Price, as put to the House by the Foreign Secretary, Margaret Beckett, it is that it would wholly untrue to suggest that the government does not have a clear exit strategy on Iraq. It does… the problem being that its strategy has nothing whatsoever to do with stabilising the country and permitting our troops to return home and everything to do with permitting Tony Blair to exit 10 Downing Street (and most likely the House of Commons, itself) without ever having been called to account for his government’s actions in taking us into this war in the first place.

For those disclined to wade through the rhetoric and repetition of a Parliamentary debate, Beckett’s lengthy rejoinder to the opposition’s motion rauns broadly as follows:

First, there is in the government’s opinion, no need for a debate as there have already been four separate inquiries into the Iraq War (Foreign Affairs Committee, Intelligence and Security Committee, the Hutton Inquiry and the Butler Inquiry).

Of these inquires…

The Foreign Affairs Committee reported in July 2003 on ‘The Decision to go to war in Iraq’ and concluded that:

the accuracy of most of the claims in relation to Iraq’s nuclear weapons programme could only be judged once the Iraq Survey Group has gained access to the relevant scientists and documentation.

Given that the ISG found no evidence to support any of the claims of Iraq’s weapons capabilities cited by the government in the lead in to the war and issued its report long before there was sufficient evidence on which to base any substantive conclusions, the FAC’s findings can be safely considered to be of no relevance whatsoever.

The Intelligence and Security Committee reported in September 2003 and produced a report that ‘does not judge whether the decision to invade Iraq was correct’.

The Hutton Inquiry into the circumstances surrounding of the death of Dr. David Kelly revealed much of interest during its evidentiary stages and then produced a report that is widely (and justifiably) considered to be a complete whitewash. Consideration of whether the decision of invade Iraq was justified or taken correctly was not within its remit, which together with its personnel, was set by No. 10.

The remit of the Butler Inquiry specifically excluded any consideration of the role of politicians, which was considered unnecessarily restrictive by opposition parties.

So what we have are four separate inquiries of which one met and reported prematurely and in the absence of sufficient information to arrive at any substantive conclusions, while the other three were hamstrung by being handed tightly-defined remits by the government that precluded any substantive consideration of the conduct and actions of the Executive (i.e the government).

Second, it would, according Beckett, send ‘the wrong signals at the wrong time’, distract resources and attention from ‘where they are most needed’ and would risk ‘appearing to set a deadline for our operations in Iraq which would be politically and militarily damaging’.

Having outlined this view, Beckett goes on to state that:

…that this is not the time for making these decisions. I will tell the hon. Gentleman why. Our words in the House today will be heard a very long way away. They can be heard by our troops, who are already in great danger in Iraq. They can be heard by the Iraqi people and by their Government, many of whose members I know many hon. Members in all parts of the House have met—people whose bravery and fortitude is humbling and who still need our support, not the rehashing of issues that have been gone over umpteen times in the House.

In short, now is not the time for Parliament to seek to hold the Executive to account for its actions because it might (a) upset the troops, (b) upset the Iraqis, and (c) take up time and resources that, in the Executive’s opinion, would be better deployed elsewhere and, as indicated by her first argument, would simply be going over old ground again.
This third point above, the complaint that inquiries ‘deflect resources away from other priority matters’ is fast becoming the stock response of government to any call for an independent inquiry on any subject – near identical arguments were advanced in response to calls for an independent inquiry into the events leading to and during the terrorist attack on the London Underground on 7 July 2005 and as justification for the government’s decision to release only an ‘official narrative’ of the events of that day, one that, on its initial release, was found to contain errors of fact.

There can be no more contemptible response to a call for an inquiry into the conduct of the Executive and of its agents and servants than that which dismisses such a call on the grounds that the whole exercise would simply be too bothersome, time-consuming and expensive to contemplate.

The message from government is simple. You (the electorate) cannot have an inquiry because we (the government) do not think its worth all the hassle. Accountability is not a priority of government, even when the call for a inquiry is supported or initiated by Members of Parliament. Democracy and the accountability of a government to the British people is a once in four (or five) years exercise in putting a cross in box on a ballot paper, by which time we (the government) judge that you will have other things on your mind and will have most likely fogetton all about this messy business of inquiries.
Is it any wonder that almost 40% of the electorate choose not to vote in general elections when the view of politicians is that no soon as one of them has received the Queen’s invitation to form a government, they are then above and beyond all considerations of public accountability until the next time, some four years away at least, that they need the British people to go out an complete another exercise in box-crossing.

Moving a little further on in the debate, John Maples casts further doubt on the value of one of the inquiries cited by Beckett as rendering a further inquiry unnecessary; that of the Foreign Affairs Committee:

The Foreign Secretary prayed in aid the [Foreign Affairs] Select Committee’s report. I was a member of that Committee, and I have to say to her that her predecessor and the Government obstructed the Committee’s proceedings at every stage possible, refusing to produce witnesses and documents.

Only to receive this by way of response:

I followed those matters as carefully as I could, and I observed—and I observed it from Committee members who had ministerial experience—people asking for papers and for disclosures which they, as former Ministers and experienced Members of the House, would never for a single second have contemplated disclosing. I reject utterly the suggestion that the Committee did not get full support.

If all else fails, then one can always hide behind the calcified doctrine of official secrecy and, better still, when the opportunity arises, upbraid one’s opponents fro requesting information that they would not, themselves, make available were their positions reversed.

It was Winston Churchill who attempted to set out the dictum that the purpose of the Official Secrets Act was for the defence of the national interest and should be used to cover-up the incompetence of politicians and public officials, and yet, time and again, it transpires that the all-pervasive culture of official secrecy that lies at the heart of government in the UK has been used, on a near routine basis, for precisely the purpose of covering the embarrassment of Ministers and/or Civil Servants.

Beckett’s response to Maples charge that the government failed to co-operate fully with the Foreign Affairs Committee has to be placed in its proper context. Although not a Member of Parliament at the time of the publication of the Scott Report, Maples was, at the time of the collapse of the trial of four directors of Matrix Churchill, which led to the Scott Inquiry and revealed the Conservative government’s duplicity on arms sales to Iraq during the 1980’s, serving as Economic Secretary and therefore a member of the very government that was prepared, at the time, to use it its full powers of official secrecy to conceal its own double-dealing in the matter of the supply of British equipment to Saddam’s munitions industry, even to the extent of allowing innocent men to go to prison to avoid political embarrassment. To then dismiss, some 10 years later, Maples complaint of non-cooperation on the grounds that he should know better than to ask for secret information without exhibiting any recognition of precisely the difficulties that the government in which Maples served got into over their interpretation of what constitutes an official secret is to show both a lack a judgment (or perhaps memory) and a general contempt for the capacity of the electorate to remember what is, after all, only fairly recent history.

Beckett then goes on to add a further argument against an inquiry.

What happens in the House today will be heard not only by those in Iraq—the people and the Government—but by those whose intention it is to do us harm, whether in Iraq or beyond. Again, I ask the House to consider whether now is the time to send a signal—every Member of the House knows in their heart that this is true—which many will undoubtedly interpret as a weakening of our commitment.

And that settles it, for who could possibly consider a course of action that might encourage the enemy and raise questions about the UK’s commitment and resolve, as if to suggest that such matters are likely to determined here in Whitehall and not 3,000 miles away in Washington DC.

If there is to be a timetable drawn-up for the withdrawal of British Forces from Iraq then only the most conceited ‘Colonel Blimp’. With Tony Blair at the helm, there is no possibility of such a withdrawal taking place without it first being agreed with the US and timed to coincide with the scaling down of America’s commitment to Iraq, nor is there any real possibility that such a timetable will be defined in terms of anything other the demands of the US’s domestic political agenda.

Just as the window of opportunity for the 2003 Invasion was predetermined by domestic considerations, most importantly the pre-eminent need to have the main ‘shooting match’ done and dusted before Bush’s re-election campaign began in earnest - aircraft full flag-draped body-bags being a widely acknowledged vote-loser in US domestic politics - so any timetable for the scaling back of US Forces in Iraq will be set to coincide with the campaign timetable for the next US Presidential elections. With Bush forced to stand down on this occasion due to the constitutional limitations that restrict Presidents to two terms of office, the last thing that the Republican Party with either want (or need) is an Iraq-sized ‘monkey’ of the Bush Administration’s devising on their next candidate’s back.

If Beckett has, thus far, constructed her defence on a platform of contempt for the notion of accountability, her next significant response, to a question (below) from Malcolm Rifkind, is little short of staggering in its disregard for Parliament.

Rifkind: Does the Foreign Secretary realise that her opposition to an inquiry into the origins of the Government’s policy on Iraq would be more convincing if the Government were not simultaneously bitterly opposing any debate on the future of their policy in Iraq? Is she not ashamed that, in the three years since the war, the Government have not initiated a single debate on the subject in this Chamber? The United States Congress was permitted a full debate on the matter as recently as June. Is it not appalling that, when the Government have been responsible for such an arrant misuse of their powers, this Chamber has not been allowed to debate the matter?

Beckett: The right hon. and learned Gentleman is talking complete nonsense, as he must be well aware. He is a former Secretary of State for Defence, and he knows that there are five defence debates a year and that there are debates on foreign policy, all of which are in Government time. Of course it is open to people to debate those issues.

In other words, it is open to MPs to attempt to inject questions on Iraq into government debates on Defence and Foreign Policy where the actual subject matter of the debate may be – and has been throughout the last three years – anything but Iraq… and all, presumably, at the risk of being upbraided by the Speaker (or whichever of his deputies may be on duty) for seeking to take the debate away from the government’s preferred topic, whatever that might be.
It is the government that has exclusive control of the business schedule of the House, and but for the occasional ‘opposition day’ such as took place on Tuesday, it is the government that determines the subject matter of any substantive debate in the Commons. If therre has not been a substantive debate on UK policy for the future of Iraq in the last three years then the responsibility for that lies with the government and with no one else.

If truth be told, an inquiry into the circumstances leading in to the decision to join Bush in his little Middle-Eastern adventure is unlikely to tell us anything that is not already well-known and in the public domain.

We know, for example, that following the invasion of Iraq, the best efforts of the US-led coalition to turn up evidence to support their pre-war assertion that Saddam Hussein posed a genuine and immediate threat to global security proved only that no such threat existed. Try as they might, they could produce no evidence of Iraq’s supposed WMD capabilities, upon which the prospectus for war was constructed and sold both to Parliament and to the British people.

We know, from the evidentiary sessions of the Hutton Inquiry, that in preparing its false prospectus for war, Downing Street sat atop the entire process of compiling the information presented to Parliament to justify the war and took charge of its ‘presentation’; and in doing so stripped from the report given to Parliament any shred of equivocation, doubt and uncertainty, qualities that, according to the late Robin Cook in his book ‘The Point of Departure’, are omnipresent in intelligence briefing as the security community has a routine and healthy respect, if not obsession, with understanding the limitations of intelligence reports.

We know that it was only shortly before the presentation of the first of Hans Blix’s reports on the result of UN weapons inspections (in February 2003 and a mere four or so weeks prior to the matter of support for the war being put to a Parliamentary vote, that the government began to profess humanitarian concern for the Iraqi people, despite having shown no particular interest in their plight during the preceding five years of the Blair government.

(For the record, Blair’s first reference to harbouring humanitarian concern for the Iraqi people came during PMQ’s on Wednesday 12th February 2003…

There is the threat that we have identified in the resolution last year and, indeed, for the past 12 years, and there are two ways of dealing with it. [Interruption.] Someone shouts out the word “containment”. When we look at the issue and the moral background to the decisions that have to be taken, I agree that, before we take the decision to go to war, the morality of that should weigh heavily on our conscience because innocent people die as well as the guilty in a war, but let us look at the morality of the present policy that we have towards Iraq and the policy that we have had for the past 12 years—a policy of sanctions that, because of the way that Saddam has implemented those sanctions, leaves Iraq in this state: with 130 deaths per 1,000 children under the age of five, with 60 per cent. of the population on food aid, with half the Iraqis in rural areas having no access to safe water and with thousands of people imprisoned or killed every year as a result of Saddam’s regime. The fact is that the only—[Interruption.] I am sorry; the only alternative to disarmament by the United Nations is that we keep sanctions in place year on year, and I am simply saying that that is also a moral choice with bad and devastating consequences for the Iraqi people.

Blair went on to expand on this line of argument at the Scottish Labour Party conference in early March, by which time he was actively ‘bedding-in’ the humanitarian line of argument as a fall-back position while gradually drawing back from making assertions on Iraq’s WMD capabilities in light of the content of the first Blix report. By this time the rhetoric had quietly shifted from talk of actual WMDs to talk of WND ‘programmes’, which is certainly not the same thing (nor anything capable of deployment within 45 minutes.)

We know that, in his full memorandum to government on the question of the legality of an invasion of Iraq that Lord Goldsmith, the Attorney General, unequivocally stated that the war could not legally be entered into for the express purpose of bringing about a change of regime in Iraq.

We know that in the three years since the invasion, the entire case for war put forward by the government has entirely disintegrated as has the assertion of the time that the Clinton-era policy of ‘containment’ in Iraq was ‘failing’; for all that Oliver Kamm appears to be remain quaintly wedded to that particular notion, which, in a recent response to an article by Norman Geras in which Geras recants his support for the Iraq War, he presents an undoubted truism of the position in Iraq leading up to the US-led Invasion.

Containment was not working. This matters greatly to the justification of the war, at the time and in hindsight. The alliance of Leninists and Islamists who make up the misnamed Stop the War Coalition was of course unfazed by the approaching failure of containment, because it saw in those policies evidence of Western imperialist designs.

Kamm is indulging here in much the same order of tendentious linguistic legerdemain that characterised a number of Tony Blair’s statements on Iraq in the month or so prior to the war, as here…

However, if we fail to implement resolution 1441, and if we lack the determination and resolution to make sure that that mandate is carried, the consequence will be that Saddam is free to develop weapons of mass destruction. Also, there will be an increasing risk that the threat of those weapons of mass destruction and the existing terrorist threat will join together. This country will then be less secure and safe. – PMQs, 12 February 2003

Alternatively—and I think that this is a powerful and developing threat that the world must face—the risk is that states such as Iraq, which are proliferating these chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, will combine in a way that is devastating for the world with terrorists who are desperate to get their hands on those weapons to wreak maximum destruction.

The events of 11 September, of course, changed many American minds about the threat, but they should also change all our minds. Surely everyone accepts that, had the people involved been able to cause even more death and destruction, they would have done so? My worry is that, when there are nations that proliferate, trade and develop this stuff, and terrorist groups that are desperate to cause maximum destruction, the world has to stand firm. The matter has come to a point over Iraq. If we do not stand firm over Iraq now, we will never be able to deal with the next threat that encompasses us. – PMQs, 5 March 2003

Much as Blair sought to imply the existence of a connection between Iraq, its non-existent WMDs and the risk that such terrible weapons might find their way into the hands of an Islamic terrorist group (and by implication at the time this would have meant Al Qaeda) via Iraq without levelling any specific (and easily refuted) allegations to that effect, so Kamm attempts to bolster the assertion that containment wasn’t working by implying that its now only political extremists within the ‘Stop the War’ coalition who hold to the belief that the policy of containment was still effective up to the point at which the invasion actually began.

Neither was/is correct in either their stated view or that which they are seeking to imply.

In Blair’s case, not only was there never any substantive connection between the Ba’athist regime in Iraq and Al Qaeda but even where it could established that Iraq had contact with and even actively supported terrorist organisations (as was the case with Hamas) Saddam never once showed any inclination to share any chemical or biological weapons (or any associated technology) with them or with anyone but his own trusted military forces. Ironically, Saddam was too much the controlling dictator and tyrant to ever share his, at one time, more potent weapons systems with anyone else, even during the period of the 1991 Gulf War during which he launched missile attacks on Israel in the vain hope of provoking a military response from the Israelis that would have split the coalition - those Middle Eastern countries that took an active role at the time could support the US-led liberation of Kuwait and defeat of Iraq, but not an intervention in the war by Israel.

Kamm offers no evidence in his article to support his contention that containment was failing – presumably this is to be found in his book which, mercifully, he only plugs twice on this occasion. Instead he attempts simply to discredit any notion that containment was not failing by associating it with an extremist and heavily politicised anti-war position – he also appears to consider the distinctly Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party, which forms that part of the core of the ‘Stop the War’ coalition most engaged in contructing communalist alliances with Islamic groups, to be ‘Leninists’, which appears to suggest that either his understanding of the intricacies of ‘far-left’ political thought and alignments or, perhaps, his attention span in writing his lengthy response to Geras, is not all that it might be.

A rather different appraisal of containment is to be found in the late Robin Cook’s book, “The Point of Departure”…

It was evident from the government’s approach to this and other debates on Iraq that Number 10 had abandoned the long-standing Western strategy of containing the threat from Saddam in favour of military action. This came as unwelcome news to me as during my years at the Foreign Office I had administered, with the full support of Number 10, a policy of containment designed to keep Saddam in a tight cage from which he could not escape and no weapons could get through. There were problems with containment. Even after we lifted restrictions on the volume of oil Saddam could sell officially through the Oil for Food programme, he continued to smuggle large volumes of oil in order to use the illicit income for his own priorities rather than for the UN’s humanitarian purposes.

But in its central purpose of hobbling Saddam’s military ambitions containment did work. Indeed all that we have learnt in the aftermath of war is that containment was successful to a degree that even I would not have dared to hope. Saddam’s military formations were so weakened that they made little attempt to defend Baghdad and famously no weapons of mass destruction have been found, nor are expected to be found. We had succeeded in our security objectives of thwarting from converting his technical nuclear, chemical or biological capacity into actual weapons systems and had so reduced his conventional forces that they could not defend their own capital city, let alone threaten any of their neighbours.

Later in the same section, Cook goes on to address another line of argument fielded by Kamm is his article; the wholly spurious claim that the only alternative to war was to do nothing.

There are few cheaper rhetorical tricks in the armoury of the war party than the claim that those of us who believed invasion was the wrong action were therefore in favour of no action. On the contrary, we had pursued vigorous action to ensure containment, which we now know to have been a success in drawing the teeth of Saddam as a security threat. In a decade of containment, UN inspectors had disarmed more weapons than were destroyed in the first Gulf War, including forty thousand chemical shells.

Tight and effective embargoes on Iraqi imports had prevented Saddam reconstituting his programmes for weapons of mass destruction and had denied his conventional forces a single new weapons system or any state-of-the-art military technology… The strength of his conventional forces was less than half of what they were when he had invaded Iraq.

Cook saves his most damning indictment of the decision to go to war for his closing statements to this section of his book.

When I left the Foreign Office in June 2001, neither I, nor, as far as I am aware, anyone else in government, imagined that Iraq posed a real and present danger to Britain’s interests. Yet, less than two years later, the same government had concluded that we must immediately invade Iraq to remove just such a danger.

What had changed in the interim was not the military capacity of Saddam, but the policy of Washington. The new Bush Administration did not select Iraq for a victorious campaign because they really believed Saddam was a threat, but because they knew he was weak. Ironically, what had rendered him weak was the very policy of containment which they had so much derided.

Cook’s rather different view of the policy of containment is one supported by actual evidence from Iraq, not one merely sustained, as Kamm’s appears to be, by a one-dimensional portrait of Saddam as the great bogeyman of the early twenty-first century.

Noticeably, Cook is clear in his understanding both that Saddam continued to harbour aspirations of reconstituting his WMD programmes and that Iraq possessed, in its scientific community, the technical capacity to carry out such programmes – one that Iraq, incidentally, shares anything from thirty to forty other industrialised nations across the globe. Where Cook differs in his view of containment in his understanding that there is vast gulf between intent and technical capacity on the one hand and the actual delivery of usable weapons systems on the other, it being the capacity for the latter that containment had denied Iraq with – from the evidence obtained following the defeat of Saddam – absolute success.

One might well conceal a small laboratory and cadre of research scientists from the UN and its inspectors, even is country so heavily monitored by satellite as Iraq. What one cannot do – and Iraq failed to do entirely– was conceal successfully the development of the industrial capacity necessary to translate the work of such scientists into weapons systems that could be used on the battlefield or against civilian targets. Despite claims to the contrary in the war party’s false prospectus, not least those relating to the alleged rebuilding of a chlorine production facility near Fallujah, no such industrial capacity existed in Iraq immediately prior to the war. In the case of the Fallujah plant, claims that its was operational, made in September 2002, completely disregard the observations of the German inspection team from a mere five months earlier, which stated that the plant was not only not in production but had undergone no actual rebuilding since it was bombed during the first Gulf War - and, of course, after the invasion the plant was found to be just as derelict as this German team had indictated.
For all his showmanship and political posturing prior to the invasion, by the time of invasion Saddam was nothing more than a paper tiger and his defiance in the face of the UN and its weapons inspectors was no more than a ruse designed both to save face before his supporters and, more importantly, conceal the weakness of his position from his opponents. A tyrant who loses the capacity to instil terror in his opponents has but a single fate awaiting him, as former Romanian President, Nicolae Ceauşescu, discovered in all too dramatic fashion.

Who, then, is one to believe here?

Oliver Kamm, an investment banker, blogger, occasional journalist and the author of a book - which he plugs on his blog at every conceivable opportunity?

Or Robin Cook, a man who, as Foreign Secretary, held for four years not only one of the three great Offices of State but precisely that position most directly concerned with conditions in the Middle-East and the situation in Iraq?

I’ll leave you to decide for yourself, although I would suspect my own position in patently clear.

I have digressed somewhat from that point, which I set out to make and which I consider the more important arising from Tuesday’s debate, this being the now quite obvious inability of Parliament to hold the Executive to account for its conduct and actions in its role as, ostensibly, the representatives of the British people.

What, if any, useful purpose can Parliament serve if, by dint of crushing parliamentary majorities, the iron-fist of party whips (backed always by the patronage of the Prime Minister), and by legislative sleight-of-hand, such as that encapsulated in the Inquiries Act (which was passed without a vote on the consent of the ‘opposition’), it ceases to have the capacity to hold the executive to account?

There can be few things quite so damaging to the public standing of Parliament and to Parliamentary democracy that to arrive at a position in which it is a matter of public knowledge and open debate (and has been for three years) that Britain’s armed forces were committed to war, and a war of dubious legality in international law, on the basis of a false prospectus ever shred of which has since been show to have been in either substantial error on just plain untrue, only to find that Parliament, our elected representatives, are incapable of conducting a meaningful debate as to how we arrived at such a position let alone institute and inquiry to establish both why both it and the electorate were handed a prospectus for war in which any shred of veracity was conspicuous only by its absence and who might be responsible (and therefore held accountable) for what, at the very least, can only be interpreted as incompetence on a grand scale if not a wilful act of outright political mendacity.

What does that say about the present state of British democracy other than, perhaps, that our present crop of Parliamentarians would be well advised to refrain from lecturing the rest of the world on the subject of democracy and its benefits until such time as we can put our own house (or rather two houses) in proper order.

….

Title quotation: “I think that his history of mendacity is so intense and so long-lasting that he wouldn’t understand the truth if he fell over it.”

Said, without a trace of irony, by Jack Straw of Saddam Hussein in 2003

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The first object of any tyrant in Whitehall would be to make Parliament utterly subservient to his will, and the next to overthrow or dimimish trial by jury. [It] is more than an instrument of justice and more than one wheel of the constitution: it is the lamp that shows that freedom lives.

Lord Patrick Devlin (1956)

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The first part of Tim’s weekly dose of bloggy goodness (Britblog Review #65) is available for perusal, from which I find my attention drawn to Suzblog’s comments on the decision of the Appeal Court to rule in favour of the government’s attempts to remove Brian Haw from Parliament Square:

The issue is not his protest but the location and the condition of the area after all these years. He often uses a loud-hailer to shout views at MPs and passers-by. With his placard-strewn campsite, the place is an eyesore and in the hot weather quite pongy. At times the noise is quite deafening. Have to admit, I always walk on the opposite side of the road when going past the area. I feel so embarrassed by the image this ugly looking protest portrays to foreign visitors in front of the British Parliament.

So, while everyone else has been concerned over the civil liberties aspects of this case and the dramatic and unwarranted curbs that SOCAP 2005 has placed on the rights of British citizens to mount peaceful protests in Parliament Square, Susanne is far more concerned that Brian’s protest lacks a can of fucking Oust and a set of chintz fucking curtains.

Hilariously, Susanne’s previous post bewails the Lib Dems loss of control of Islington Council during the recent local authority elections with the time honoured cry of "Where did it go wrong?" - work with me on this Susanne but I rather suspect it might have just a little something to do with morons like you who think the opinions of bunch of lard-assed American tourists more important than our own civil liberties.

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    August 2007